«Furthermore, its specificity was measurably sharpened by the Kellogg-Briand pact's condemnation of war `as an instrument of national policy', or `for the solution of international controversies', for that said pretty plainly that Nation A could not use war to enforce a claim, no matter how just, against Nation B. Under the `agression' test, self-defense is pratically the only basis on which it is legitimate to engage in warfare....Presumably according to his own standards, Hitler believed his own wars to be `just'.
But whatever the historians might ultimately say about the root causes of the Second World War, it was indisputable that neither Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece nor the Soviet Union had attacked Germany. If aggression was the test of criminality, it seemed clear where the blame lay.» (p.73)
«The reason...that the Nuremberg trials took place, was that legally trained men in the seats of power in Washington concluded that German aggression could be judicially proved, that the future peace of the world would be promoted by an international determination that aggressive warfare is a crime under international law, and that those responsible may be punished.» (p.74)
«Colonel Donovan has estimated the cost of the air war alone [in Vietnam], to the end of 1968, at over $7 billion for bombs dropped and aircraft lost.
Over half of this sum was spent on bombing North Vietnam from early 1965 to late 1968. The bombing in South Vietnam has, of course, been the principal cause of civilian casualties and the `generation' of refugees.
Consider, in comparison, the American investment in care for the refugees and casualties. In the summer of 1965, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, entitled `Subcommitee on Refugees' and chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, held hearings on the refugee situation in South Vietnam, and these were followed by further investigations of both refugees and casualties in 1966 and 1967, a trip to Vietnam by Senator Kennedy in January, 1968, and a public report by the subcommittee in May, 1968.
According to the Refugee Subcommittee's report, American financial support for the care and resettlement of refugees amounted to approximately $100-million for the three years 1966 to 1968 inclusive. Medical assistance for the civilian casualties totaled $76-million for the three years 1965 to 1967....That is less than four percent of the cost of air operations alone during the same period.» (p.199-200)
«Combat command is the surest way to promotion, and the Army and Air Force were only too glad to find a new theater for military experimentation. As Colonel Donovan describes the professional consequences:
`The highly trained career officers of the Army and the other services have found the Vietnam war a frustrating but fascinating professional challenge. The very size and scope of the American military force has also generated unceasing pressures to satisfy such military demands as trying out new weapons and using the war as a military testing ground and laboratory.
Helicopter assault theories, air mobile operations concepts,new helicopter types, new weapons and organisations, and counterinsurgency tactics were all ready for trial by the Army in Vietnam. It was not a life-or-death war in defense of the United States, but rather a remote and limited conflict where training and equipment could be tested and combat experience renewed or attained by the professionals...» (p. 200-201)
2. From the Report of the International Law Commission, 20 April-19 July 1991 (UN Document, General Assembly Official Records):
«Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Part II
Article 15: Aggression
1. An individual who as leader or organizer plans, commits or orders the commission of an act of aggression shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced [to....].
2. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
4. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, constitutes an act of aggression, due regard being paid to paragraphs 2 and 3:
(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or annexation by the use of the force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) bombardment by ther armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(f) the action of State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
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